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This thesis investigates the risk allocation of the Portuguese water sector Public Private 
Partnerships. Its objective is to identify the risk matrix of several Portuguese water sector 
PPPs and analyze whether or not those risks were properly allocated.  
Each risk category is compared with the literature view on efficient risk allocation. The 
conclusions are then tested on 3 case studies of ongoing Portuguese water PPPs.  
The findings reflect the Portuguese PPP experience history. The water sector PPPs are 
characterized by a lack of risk transfer to the private party particularly demand risk, which 
guarantees the private operator a business with very few risks and considerable high rates of 
return, resulting in a lack of Value for Money generation. Notwithstanding these findings, the 
water sector does present specific characteristics that can justify a risk matrix where less risk 
is transferred to the private party. 
 
Sumário 
A tese investiga a alocação de risco das Parcerias Publico Privadas (PPPs) portuguesas no 
sector das águas, tendo como objetivo identificar e analisar a matriz de risco de várias PPPs 
do sector. 
As matrizes de risco das PPPs analisadas são comparadas com a visão da literatura sobre 
alocação de risco eficiente, de forma a concluir-se para cada categoria de risco se a alocação 
gera ou não valor. As conclusões são depois testadas em três casos estudo sobre 3 PPPs do 
sector. 
Os resultados refletem a história das PPP em Portugal. As PPPs do sector das águas 
caracterizam-se por uma insuficiente transferência de risco para o sector privado 
particularmente o risco da procura, o que garante ao operador privado retornos mínimos sem 
risco, que são sustentados pelo sector público. Não obstante estas conclusões, o sector das 
águas apresenta características que suportam matrizes de risco com menor transferência de 
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Over the last 25 years, Portugal has undergone a major infrastructure investment program. 
After the integration in the EU one of the country‟s prioritiesbecame to decrease the 
infrastructure deficit that was retaining economic growth (Cruz and Marques, 2011). Like 
many other countries the preferred procurement option for developing this investment plan 
was the PPP model (Cruz & Marques, 2010). The PPP option presents some advantages when 
compared to the traditional public procurement. The main ones are risk sharing, transference 
of responsibility, easier access to financing and a lower cost achieved by the efficiency gains 
and innovation brought by the private sector involvement which creates Value for Money 
(Marques & Silva, 2008).Value for money should be the main criteria by which a PPP model 
is chosen over a traditional public procurement. Value for money is created through optimal 
risk allocation, managerial and technical expertise and innovation; reduced life cycle cost; and 
improved service levels, efficiency and performance (Marques and Berg, 2011; Zheng and 
Tiong, 2010). 
Even though the Portuguese government considered the efficiency benefits brought by PPPs, 
the option for the PPP model in the country emerged mainly because of budget constraints 
and not Value for Money generation (Sarmento, 2014). 
The incentive to resort to PPPs to avoid budget constraints, the public sector lack of 
experience and poor regulatory framework together with the high concentration of PPPs led to 
several badly designed contracts. The risk allocation of a lot of these contracts was flawed 
because the private sector bore too little risk and payments from the public to the private 
sector were considerably above the investment cost (Sarmento&Renneboog, 2014). 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the risk allocation of the Portuguese water sector 
PPPs. The use of the expression “water sector” refers to the household water supply, and 
domestic wastewater and solid waste treatment is common in Portugal. This thesis will follow 
this terminology as well. More specificallythe follow questions are addressed: 
i) How were risks allocated in the water PPPs selected? Consequently, 
ii) Were the risks properly allocated? Was this risk allocation compatible with Value for 
Money generation? 
In Portugal, the water sector is open to partnerships with the private sector since 1993. The 
PPP model has been used by a lot of municipalities since then, which allowed private 
operators to manage water supply and residual water services both at the operational and 
construction level (Marques & Silva, 2008). The use of PPPs allowed for a successful story as 
far as bridging the infrastructure gap in this sector. Upon adhesion to the European 
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Communities, Portugal lagged significantly in this field. Within a generation, the standards of 
service and coverage in potable water supply, sewage access and landfills for solid waste are 
up to par with the most developed nations of the EU(ERSAR report, 2013). This, in part, can 
be explained by the efficiency brought in by the private partners into many PPPs in this 
sector, but also by the incentives created by the contracts. Many times, these incentives 
trampled the risk allocation in ways that compromised the long term sustainability of some 
projects. This thesis documents and explains these particular issues. 
The dissertation follows a theoretical discussion on risk allocation as applied to the 
Portuguese situation. In addition to this, several case studies are analyzed with particular 
emphasis on ongoing PPPs where the risk allocation become a critical issue.  
The paper is organized as followed. Literature review will be presented in section 2 where the 
PPP concepts will be discussed.Section 3 outlines the research methodology.In section 4, a 
comprehensive background on the water PPP case is provided.In section 53 case studies about 




2. Literature review 
2.1 PPP definition 
There is no clear consensus on what constitutes a public-private partnership (PPP). OECD 
defines a public-private partnership as an agreement between the government and one or more 
private partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according to which the 
private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of the 
government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the 
effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners 
(OECD, 2008). 
PPPsfill a space between traditionally procured government projects and full privatization. 
PPPs are thus an alternative to public sector traditional procurement, where the Government 
specifies the design of the infrastructure, calls for bids and pays to a private-sector contractor 
for the construction of the facility, and once the construction is finished, the asset is 
transferred back and operated by the government (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
PPPs also differ from full privatization, and according to Vega (1997), the difference lies in 
the transferred risk. Privatization involves no strict alignment of objectives since it usually 
means that the government is not involved in the output specification of the privatized entity 
to pursue maximum profit (OECD, 2008). In a privatization all risks are transferred to the 
private sector. 
The key distinction between PPPs and traditional procurement as well as privatization is the 
allocation of risk and the role of risk as an efficiency driver (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011). 
 
2.2 Value for money 
The drive to use PPPs is increasingly premised on the pursuit of value for money (OECD, 
2008). 
In the context of a PPP, Value for Money essentially is created when the private sector 
provides the same quality and quantity of services at a lower cost than traditional public 
procurement. The cost effectiveness of the PPP comes from the greater efficiency achieved by 
the private company. 
PPPs will only create Value for Money if there is private sector efficiency that sufficiently 
compensates the price difference between the project‟s weighted-average cost of capital 
(WACC) and the risk-free rate (Rf). The efficiency advantage stems from the allocation and 
management of risk. Transferred risk is better managed by the private sector therefore costs 
are lower than what they would be if managed by a public entity. Hence, the allocation of risk 
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and appropriate risk valuation models are critical issues for PPPs (Sarmento and Renneboog, 
2014). 
Ultimately, value-for-money (VfM) is created through optimal risk allocation, managerial and 
technical expertise and innovation; reduced life cycle cost; and improved service levels, 
efficiency and performance (Marques and Berg, 2011; Zheng and Tiong, 2010). 
 
2.2.1 Value for Money and risk allocation 
As it was mentioned, the efficiency advantage brought by a PPP stems from the allocation and 
management of risk. Risk management will involve tree main steps: Risk identification – 
identify critical risk factors of PPP projects; Risk evaluation – evaluate how the critical risks 
affect the success of PPP projects; Risk allocation – establish equitable risk sharing 
mechanism among stakeholders. 
Risk transfer is one of the most important factors in the generation of VfM from PPPs. Merely 
having a private partner to deliver the service is not a sufficient condition to insure an 
improvement in service delivery. To achieve such an improvement there must be sufficient 
risk transfer to the private partner (Corner, 2006). 
The major principle behind risk transfer is to allocate risk to the party best able to bear it. This 
implies that whoever assumes the risk must have the freedom to handle it as they think best. It 
is therefore appropriate for the Public Authority to retain risks which relate to matters which 
the private sector cannot control cost-effectively or which the private sector cannot be given 
freedom to handle (E.R. Yescombe, 2007).  
Private parties accept most risks, provided the premium paid suffices. Therefore, the question 
for the government is whether the risk premium is good value for money or whether it is more 
cost-effective to accept the risk itself, taking into account the likelihood of a certain risk 
occurring and how government bodies may be able to mitigate the impacts. The government 
may therefore agree to assume some risks for which the private party would charge too much 
if the risk transfer to the private party were to remain complete(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). 
 
2.2.2 Factors that distort Value for money 
The choice between using a PPP or a traditional procurement should be driven by Value for 
money; however in practice the notion of Value for Money is quite blur and factors other than 
value for money end up skewing the decision towards one of the options, which ends up 
distorting the real purpose of using PPPs. 
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One of the main criticisms of PPPs is precisely being an „off-budget temptation‟ for 
governments which clearly distorts Value for Money creation. PPPs can enable governments 
to make public investments and postpone the expenditures without compromising the current 
budget and debt (Sarmento, 2014). A UK survey (Li, 2005) found that risk allocation is the 
first priority for the private sector, whereas it is a secondary priority for the public sector 
following the overcoming of budgetary constraints. 
Other criticisms on PPPs have been raised: (i) the real levels of enhanced efficiency (Glaister, 
1999); (ii) the level of accountability of PPPs (Broadbent, 2003; Froud, 2003; Asenova& 
Beck, 2010); (iii) the efficient government management of the (unavoidable) problem of 
incomplete contracting (Blanc-Brude  H. Goldsmith & T. Valila, 2006, 2009); and (iv) the 
level of VfM generation for the public sector (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002a, 2005b). 
The use of PPPs also entails certain disadvantages for the public sector. PPPs reduce the 
public sector‟s power in addressing changing needs and circumstances (Quiggin, 2005) 
because there is limited opportunity for the renegotiation of contracts. Additionally, even in 
cases where a contract renegotiation is possible, the private sector has a significant advantage 
from information asymmetry.  
According to Sarmento and Renneboog, most academic studies show that PPP projects do not 
generate VfM, which confirms that there are a lot of factors that distort VfM creation. This 
contrasts with the majority of government reports which conclude that PPPs create VfM. 
There is however evidence that a lot of this government reports are biased in favor of PPPs 
(Sarmento and , 2014). 
 
2.3 Optimal risk Allocation 
As it was already mentioned, one of the key factors to achieve Value for Money in public 
service provision via PPPs lies in allocating the risk to party best able to manage it (Lewis, 
2001). 
An optimal risk allocation reduces the economic cost, provides incentive for sound 
management, and reduces the need for future renegotiation (Asenova& Beck, 2010). Good 
risk allocation allocates the risk to the party best able to manage it. To best manage the risk 
means to manage it at least cost and thereby reduce the long term cost of the project (Corner, 
2006).  
Loosemore et al. (2006) recommends that risks should only be transferred to or retained by 
the entity possessing five qualities: 
1. Awareness: is fully aware of the risks it is taking. 
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2. Mitigation and diversification opportunities: provides evidence of having the capacity 
to manage the risk effectively and efficiently 
3. Technical skills and resources: has the capability and resources to assess and evaluate 
risk. 
4. Risk tolerance: possesses an appetite to take the risk (it will affect the risk premium 
demanded). 
Using economic theory terms, an efficient situation can be defined as one where the risk 
allocation cannot be varied without the total risk premium for the entire project being 
increased, an approach based on Pareto optimality. The Pareto optimal outcome would be one 
where each individual risk is allocated to the party which would charge the lowest risk 
premium for bearing that risk.  
Risk allocation should therefore reflect how the private party „prices‟ the risk and whether it 
is reasonable for the government to pay that price, taking into account the likelihood of the 
risk eventuating, the cost to government if it retained that risk, and government‟s ability to 
mitigate any consequences if the risk materializes.If neither party is in a position of full 
control, both parties may share the risk through various risk-sharing mechanisms (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005). 
 
2.3.1 Literature Risk Matrix 
The table below presents a standardized risk matrix that summarizes the literature view on the 
optimal risk allocation of several risk categories relevant to the water sector PPPs.  
Several author‟s opinions regarding how each risk category should be allocated are displayed 
in the table below. This risk matrix will be used as a benchmarking tool to analyzethe 
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2.4 PPPs in Portugal 
Over the last 25 years Portugal has undergone a major infrastructure investment program in 
many different areas. After the integration in the EU (and the following access to large capital 
funds), one of the country‟s priorities became to decrease the infrastructure deficit that was 
always regarded as a cause for lacking economic growth. In areas such as the highway 
construction, hospital construction and management, the water sector, energy (electricity and 
gas) supply, the preferred procurement option for developing this investment plan was the 
PPP model (Cruz and Marques, 2010). 
Between the late 90s and early 2000s there was an intense period of PPP development in 
Portugal. However the lack of past experience and legislative framework together with the 
necessity of infrastructures and the absence of relevant costs during the first years of the 
contract has contributed to excessive PPPs, badly designed contracts and underestimation of 
future costs. After almost a decade, the prevailing challengewas how to bear the costsof the 
PPPs(Marques, 2008). Almost another decade later, this challenge was consummated in a 
massive public finances‟ crisis to which PPPs‟ obligations contributed significantly.  
Specific legislation to regulate Public Private Partnerships was only launched in 2003, 
designing a common framework for all PPP projects, namely, the design and preparation of 
tender procedures, contract awarding and monitoring (Marques and Silva, 2008). The projects 
signed before the approval of this legislative package did not have any guidelines regarding 
risk sharing and renegotiations. The lack of specific legislation and also of a public body able 
to deal with the complexity of PPP projects resulted in the absence of accountability (Cruz 
and Marques, 2011). 
The rationale for developing PPP arrangements was to allow the public sector to extract value 
from a profit oriented approach and design a financing scheme that would relieve the financial 
effort of investing in large sunk infrastructures. Experience suggested that the former was the 
main motive for PPP development, although most of the value of a PPP model relies on the 
ability to have a private management, profit-oriented, able to develop efficient solutions. The 
















When governments were launching a project, there was no legal instrument to incorporate the 
annual rents for the duration of the contract into a “public balance sheet”. The annual payment 
was a long term concern, and was not accounted conveniently (Martins et al., 2011). 
After the 2008 financial crisis, private capital lenders became less available to assume risks 
and the national debt crisis has forced the government to reduce public investment. As a result 
a lot of PPP projects were postponed or canceled. The difficulties however donot concern 
only the inability to launch future projects but also the payment of existing rents. 
Around these years amassive financial effort on the Portuguese government part was 
demanded. Considering the projects launched, for the global contracting period of 2008 and 
2050, the annual average burden wouldbe 1,122 million Euros, with a peak above 2,000 
million Euros in the period between 2014 and 2019. These projects place Portugal as the 
largest PPP user in Europe, weighted by GDP (Sarmento, 2014). 
In 2011, with the financial assistance program under the auspices of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the so called 
“Troika”), Portugal was immediately asked in the signed MoU to take three different 
measures with respect to PPPs: 1- halt all new contracts; 2- assess existing ones, 3- 
renegotiate all contingent obligations arising from old contracts. These measures somewhat 
attenuated current and future financial impacts with PPPs in particular with the highway 
concessions. (Reis &Sarmento, 2016). 
 
2.4.1 Water sector PPPs in Portugal 
The water sector is composed of the water supply services (which includes all the activities 
involved in supplying water to the population in both urban and rural areas) and wastewater 
treatment (which includes all the activities related to the collection, treatment and final 
destiny of the waste products). These services are considered essential to the citizenswell-
being, public health, economic activity and environmental protection. As a result they have to 
follow certain principles that include universality of access, service quality, efficiency and 
price equality (ERSAR, 2013). 
The market structure associated with the water sector is a natural monopoly due to the high 
entrance costs associated with construction investments as well as the high maintenance costs. 
Due to the public nature of the service, the water system is mainly managed by the 
government (Lima, 2010). 
In Portugal, the water sector was solely managed by the public sector until 1993. In that year 
legislation changes occurred that allowed the access of the private parties to this sector, which 
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was previously forbidden. More specifically it allowed the concession of the exploration and 
management of the water systems to private companies (Marques & Silva, 2008). 
The PPP model is very relevant in the water sector, covering: 
-  50% of the population in water supply services (“wholesale category”), 
-  18.19% of the population in water supply services (“retail category”) 
- 70% of the population  in residual water treatment services (“wholesale category) 
- 19% of the population in residual water treatment services (“retail category”) (ERSAR 
report, 2013). 
Due to poor procurementlegislation, theseoriginal PPPs are characterized by bad planning and 
procedures. There is no proper analysis of the risk involved and the subsequent allocation; 
there is no calculation of the Public Sector Comparator and there are no second negotiation 
rounds to improve the contractual conditions. Furthermore the procurement rules do not allow 
the proper comparison of proposals and as result donot allow the best options to be chosen. 
Overall PPPs are not driven by Value for Money which ends up creating badly designed 
contracts that affect negatively the municipalities (Marques & Silva, 2008). 
The major factors that contribute to the inefficiency of the PPP procedure in water sector are: 
Lack of competition in the water sector market, inefficient and lack of performance 
monitoring of the contracts, small dimension of the majority of the municipalities andpoor 





To answer the first research question (how were risks allocated in the Portuguese water sector 
PPPs?) 17Portuguese water PPPswill be analyzed and the respective risk matrix of each will 
beoutlined. The data on the risk matrix was drawn directly from the PPP contracts. The 
compiled risk matrix, which will be presented in chapter 4, is the basis for the analysis that 
follows the 2nd research question.  
In order to evaluate if the risk allocation was optimal (2nd research question), two analyses 
will be done: 
- A comparison between the literature view on risk allocation and the risk matrix of the 
PPPs analyzed. 
- 3 case studies about specific PPPs will be developed to test the conclusions of the 
analysis above. 
 
3.1 Literature Review Comparison 
In order to make the first assessment on whether the water sector PPPs risks were properly 
allocated, the contract‟s risk matrix will be compared with the literature view on optimal risk 
allocation.  
Table 1 (Literature risk matrix) which summarizes the literature view on optimal risk 
allocation will be compared with the water sector PPPs risk matrix. Each risk category will be 
analyzed and the authors‟ arguments will be weighted considering the specific characteristics 
of the water sector. 
 
3.2 Case Study 
Finally, it will be developeda case study on 3 specific PPPs thatwere object of an economic-
financial equilibrium reposition and a litigation process. 
The case study will show the influence of the risk allocation on the negative outcome of those 
specific PPP, which will allow testing the conclusions made in the first analysisas well as 
giving more concrete answers to more ambiguous conclusions. 
The case study‟s research design willinclude the definition of research questions, whichwill 
be translated into propositionsso that data collection can be structured in order to support or 
refute those research propositions. An approach based on Robert Yin rationale (Robert Yin, 





4. The Case of theWater PPPsin Portugal 
4.1 Background 
The analysis will focus on 17 water PPPs whose scope includedboth the water supply and 
residual water treatment.In all contracts, the private party wasresponsible for both managing 
the activities as well as making infrastructure investments.All private operator revenues 
should come exclusively from asset management, meaning the tariffs charged should sustain 
the private operator profit margins.  
The table below summarizes the characteristics of the PPPs that will be analyzed. 
 
Table 2 – Portuguese Water Sector Public-Private Partnerships (source: author) 
PPP Municipality Year Population Major Shareholder PPP company 
Shareholder 
expected IRR 
PPP private party 
investment 
amount 
Campo Maior 2007 8.387 
Aqualia, S.A. 
Águas de Campo Maior, S.A. 
14,32% 
4.031.822 
Elvas 2008 15.308 Águas do Norte Alentejano - 
Azambuja 2009 6.300 
Aquapor, lda* 
Águas da Azambuja, S.A. 
12,65% 
- 
Setúbal 1997 113.934 Águas do Sado, S.A. - 
Trancoso 1997 10.889 Águas da Teja, S.A 4.682.504 
Cascais 2000 170.683 Aquapor,Lda. 
& 
AGS, S.A. 
Águas de Cascais S.A. 
12,65% 
- 
Figueira da Foz 1999 62.601 Águas da Figueira, S.A. 33.500.753 
Gondomar 2001 164.096 Águas de Gondomar, S.A. 60.943.355 
Barcelos 2004 122.096 
AGS,S.A. 
Águas de Barcelos, S.A. 
11% 
116.636.461 
Paços de Ferreira 2004 52.985 AGS Paços de Ferreira,S.A. 71.839.772 
Matosinhos 2007 167.026 
Indaqua,S.A. 
Indáqua Matosinhos, S.A. 
12,98% 
83.207.180 
Vila do Conde 2008 74.391 Indaqua Vila do Conde - 
Ourém 1996 46.216 
CGEP, S.A. 
Veolia Água - Águas de Ourém, S.A. 
- 
16.832.267 
Paredes 2001 83.376 Veolia Água – Águas de Paredes, S.A 58.197.000 
Valongo 2000 88.005 




All private parties involved in the selected PPPs are “fully private”, and integrate the 
following 5 groups: Aqualia, Aquapor, AGS, Indaqua and CGEP.It is important to mention 
however that Aquapor belonged to Aguas de Portugal (state owned company) until 2008, 
when it was sold to DST and DBB.This implies that the PPPs of Setubal, Trancoso, Cascais, 
Figueira da Foz and Gondomar contracts were celebrated between two public entities which 
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could have influenced the negotiation rationale of the PPP. Nevertheless, it should be noticed 
that the institutional framework of the partnership is prepared for the subsequent privatization 
of Aguas de Portugal and its subsidiaries, which implies the contracts and their respective risk 
matrix were constructed so that the PPP would be attractive the private party. 
Most contracts werenot subjected to any study of economic viability. There was no Public 
Sector Comparator calculation or any other assessment of Value for Money. Most of these 
contracts were signed without a clear regulatory framework. The major argument given by the 
municipalities for the lack of value for money assessment studies was the fact that legislation 
didnot previewed any regulatory frameworkto guide Public Private Partnerships. 
This implies already that the reasoning behind this PPP deals was distorted. The choice of the 
PPP model over traditional public procurement was not based on the efficiency brought by the 
private sector, as already stated in the literature review. 
 
4.2 Risk Matrix 
The compiled risk matrix was gathered from the PPP contracts. The contracts establish how 
risks were allocated between the private and public partners and mentionhow the public 
partner has to compensate the private partner if the risks kept in the public sphere materialize. 
The compensations can be made using the following instruments: Direct compensation to the 
private partner; tariff increase to the consumers;reduced investment responsibilities to the 
private partner; extra revenues given to the private partner; measures to compensate 
operational costs and extension of the contract period.  
The main risks involved in the water PPPs are the following: 
- Design and Construction Risks: Include risks related to the investment phase namely 
investment cost overrun, delays and unilateral changes in the investment plan and technical 
risks (due to engineering and design failure). 
- Operation and maintenance risks, whicharise when the assets are in place and can 
result from events such as cost overrun related to inefficient procedures, variation in the cost 
of water and asset obsolesce. 
- Market risks include the risk of demand variation in relation to forecasts.  The main 
factors influencing water demand are customer microeconomic behavior, population growth, 
water consumption patterns and the use of illegal connectors, namely use of private wheels 
and septic tanks, in alternative to connecting to the public water supply or sewage systems. 
- Tariff risks are usually considered as market risks. However due to the monopolistic 
nature of the water sector, tariff levels are regulated or politically determined. Tariffs risk 
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arises mainly from the mechanisms of tariff adjustment and methods of economic regulation 
applied by the regulator. In the Portuguese context the municipality is currently the entity 
empowered to set the water tariffs and not the water sector regulator. 
- Financing risk which arisesfrom interest rate fluctuations and loan default risk from 
cash-flow shortage. 
- Legal and regulatory risks relate to specific country or project set of law and rules. 
Typical risks include changes in regulatory framework that guides PPPs or the water sector 
and unstable national and regional laws. 
- Political risks concern the society´s stability and social economic behavior, the 
trustworthiness of the government and general political environment, all of which are factors 
that can lead to contractual breaches. Political risks are particularly relevant to the water 
supply, since water is perceived as an essential good (Chiu and Boscher, 2005).  
- Force Majeure risk includes unpredictable external events (usually natural unavoidable 
catastrophes) that can impact negatively the conditions of the project. 
The table below presents the risk matrix of the 17PPPsthat will beanalyzed. The table 
summarizes the main risks involved in the PPP contract and how they were allocated. 
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Table 3 – Water Sector PPP´S Compiled Risk Matrix (source: author) 
 Design and Construction 
risks 
 
Operation and Maintenance 
Risks Market Risks Financing Risk 
Legal and 
political risk Tariff risk Exogenous risk 












risk Force Majeure 
Azambuja private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector public sector 
Barcelos private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector public sector 
Campo 
Maior public sector public sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >15% 
variation) 
private sector public sector public sector public sector 
Cascais private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >10% 
variation) 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector private sector 
Elvas private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >15% 
variation) 
Shared 
(Public sector >5% variation 
in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector private sector 
Figueira da 
Foz private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >15% 
variation) 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector public sector 
Gondomar private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >10% 
variation) 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector public sector 
Canaveses private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
private sector public sector public sector public sector 
Matosinhos private sector private sector private sector public sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >30% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector public sector 
Ourém private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >10% 
variation) 
private sector public sector public sector public sector 
Paços de 
Ferreira private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
private sector public sector Shared public sector 
Paredes private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
private sector public sector private sector public sector 
Tirso/Trofa public sector public sector private sector public sector private sector public sector public sector public sector 
Trancoso private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
private sector public sector public sector public sector 
Setúbal private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 
private sector public sector public sector public sector 
Vila do 
Conde private sector private sector private sector public sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >50% 
variation in EURIBOR) 
public sector public sector private sector 
Valongo private sector private sector private sector 
Shared 
(Public sector >20% 
variation) 




Most PPPs follow a similar risk allocation, which means a clear pattern can be identified. 
Construction and operational risks were the only risks completely transferred to the private 
party in all contracts. Interest rate fluctuation risk was shared in half of the PPPs and allocated 
to the private sector in the other half. Demandrisk wasmostly shared between both parties. 
Tariff, legislation change and force majeure risk were mostly allocated to the public sector. 
 
4.3 Comparison of PPPsrisk matrix with literature view on risk allocation 
In this chapter the risk allocation of the PPPs presented before will be compared with the 
literature view on how risks should be allocated. Each risk category will be analyzed 
individually, please see table 1 (literature risk matrix) and table 3 (water sector PPPscompiled 
risk matrix) for better context. The goal of this comparison is to understand if the pattern of 
risk allocation that was observed in the group of PPPs gathered is in line with the view of the 
literature onefficient risk allocation. 
As already mentioned the main principle for optimal risk allocation is that risk must be 
allocated to the party best able to control and manage it. The party in better position to 
manage the probability or the impact of a certain risk materializing is the one better equipped 
to deal with the risk. 
Each risk category will be individually analyzed considering the author‟s arguments on 
optimal risk allocation and taking into account the water sector context. 
i) Design and Construction risk 
According to Bing et all, construction risk should be assigned to contractors for all 
procurement methods. As the party responsible for making the investments, construction risk 
should be managed by the private operator.This allocation might be subject to exceptions if 
the public sector influences unilaterally the investment plan execution. 
In the majority of the PPPs analyzed, design and construction risk were allocated to the 
private party. The public party has however to compensate the private party if there is a 
financial equilibrium loss of the PPP due to a unilateral change motivated by the public party. 
The allocation followed by the PPPsanalyzed is in line with the literature view. 
ii) Operational Cost overrun  
Cost overrun usually happensdue to inefficient procedures that are under the control of the 
party responsible for investment plan execution and asset management. 
In thePPPs analyzed the private party was the one responsible for asset management and most 
of the investments. As the party better able to deal and manage those risks, the transference of 
those risks to the private party creates efficiency. 
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The majority of the contracts analyzed allocated the risks related to cost overrun to the private 
party, unless the cost overrun was motivated by changes in output specifications made by the 
public party. The risk is therefore allocated to the party responsible for the cost overrun which 
is in line with the literature arguments. 
iii) Technical obsolesce asset risk 
The risk of a certain asset becoming obsolete essentially means that the technology used in 
the provision of a certain service becomes less efficient when compared to newer 
technologies. This will translate into higher costs due to operational inefficiency that will 
reduce profit margins. The party better able to manage the risk is the private sector because it 
is the one in control of the operational procedures.  
All PPPs allocated the risk of asset technical obsolesce to the private sector which is in 
accordance with the arguments of most literature. 
iv) Demand risk 
There is no consensus in the literature regarding demand risk allocation (see Table 1). Not 
only different authors pointed to different allocations, but some authors considered that it can 
be highly variable according to the type of project. Still the majority of the literature considers 
that in most situations market risks such as demand should be allocated to the private sector.In 
a PPP where apart from the public sector retaining the ownership of the assets almost 
everything else is transferred to the private sector, market risks should be transferred to the 
private sector (Chiu and Bosher, 2005).  
The water sector however has particular characteristics. Ardnt‟s (2000) survey (to key 
participants in the Australian private infrastructure industry) has shown that when the private 
sector has no direct commercial linkwith end users (meaning it cannot control pricing and 
other variables to attract demand) the private party is less willing to fully accept demand risk. 
Given the monopolistic characteristics of the water sector and the consequent price regulation, 
as well as the inelasticity that characterizes water demand, the private operator has very little 
control in attracting additional demand.  
The main issue is therefore faulty demand forecasting which depends a lot on present and 
projected demographics of the area, microeconomic behavior of customers, water 
consumption patterns and adherence to the water supply network (use of illegal connectors). 
The party better able to predict, analyze and deal with this variables should keep the risk.  
It is not clear which party is better able to predict demand. Nevertheless the level of demand 
for a project is an important investigation to be carried out in most PPP/PFI projects during 
the detailed feasibility study phase by the private consortium (Bing, et all, 2005).As far as the 
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use of illegal water connectors, the public sector is the party better able to supervise and 
enforce the connection to the public network by using the necessary legal mechanisms to 
penalize the users of illegal connectors and obligate them to adhere to the public water 
connectors. As such, it should be the public side to bear the demand risk resulting from the 
lack enforcement of the legislation concerning the connection to the public network. 
Depending on the arguments used either an allocation to the private party or a shared 
allocation of demand risk would be acceptable.  
Most Contracts shared demand risk which is acceptable given the following arguments: 
- Private sector has limited commercial link with end users, and water demand is highly 
inelastic which limits any added benefits brought by the private sector to attract additional 
demand. 
- The public sector is the party better able to deal with the use of illegal water connectors. 
- The private party is in no better position than the government to predict demand. 
v) Tariff Changes 
Most literature considers price risk to be a market risk that should be allocated to the private 
sector. In the context of the water sector however, where price is regulated, tariff risks should 
be considered separately from market risks. 
Charging water tariffs is mainly a political decision as most governments determine how 
much a service provider is allowed to charge consumers. The risk of bad pricing can 
undermine service levels, resulting in revenue losses and increased hidden costs that partly 
explain the poor profitability and inadequate financing in the water sector (Ameyaw and 
Chan, 2014). 
The strong influence of political motives behind water pricing can translate into a very big 
risk of bad pricing that can impact negatively the private operator‟s revenueby holding down 
justifiable tariff increases for water services. Therefore, allocating this risk to the public party 
creates VfM, as the municipality is the entity that controls tariff levels. This aligns incentives, 
so that the municipality setsprices based on economic principles instead of political ones. 
Most PPPs analyzed allocated tariff risk to the public party, which is optimal considering the 
monopolistic characteristics the water sector where price is regulated. In the Portuguese 
context, the municipalities are the entities regulating the tariffs, which favor even more this 
allocation, as the entity directly involved in the PPP is in control of setting the tariff levels. 
However, this allocation was set based on a pre-agreed tariff increase which might not 
generate efficiency as the municipalities are offering a guarantee on future tariff levels that 
might not be optimal. The ideal mechanism would be to allocate to the public sector the risk 
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of not setting tariffs in accordance to a certain economical rational regarding the right margin 
level for the private operator.  
vi) Financing risk 
a. Interest rate volatility 
EURIBOR fluctuations depend mainly on macroeconomic behaviors, whichare outside the 
control of any of the parties. 
Besides EURIBOR fluctuations, spreads can also change based on the financier‟s assessment 
of the project risk. The project‟s risk profile may change and consequently the interest rate 
can vary. 
According to the World Bank, project finance debt tends to be fixed rate, which provides a 
foreseeable or at least somewhat stable, repayment profile over time to reduce fluctuations in 
the cost of infrastructure services. If lenders donot provide a fixed rate debt and none of the 
parties is willing to take the risk then hedging instruments should be implemented. 
The literature is not unanimous regarding how interest rate volatility risk should be allocated. 
Interest rates fluctuations are economic risks associated with project financing and thus 
appropriately allocated to the private sector (Bing et all, 2005). Chiu and Bosher also 
reinforce this position by stating that the private party should be the one responsible for 
managing the financial needs of the project and face the fluctuations in the financial markets. 
However, according to Lewis interest rate fluctuations without sufficient hedging should be 
shared. 
The PPPs analyzed didnot implement any hedging instruments. Contrary to Lewis opinion, 
the EIB considers that the private party should be responsible for incorporating hedging 
instruments. This implies that interest rate fluctuation risk should be allocated to the private 
party so that incentives aligned.  
Half of the PPPsanalyzed shared the risk while the other half has allocated the risk to the 
private sector, which reflects the literature divided view. 
b. Financial Structure an Default risk 
The financing structure of thePPPsanalyzed is in the form of project finance where lenders 
and investors rely mainly on the cash-flow generated by the project to repay their loans. The 
financing structure is sustained on bank financing and credit support from sponsors, which is 
typical of a project finance structure where very little equity is involved. 
The project finance structure should be designed to optimize the costs of finance for the 
project and should ensure that the interests of the main lenders to the project are aligned with 
those of sponsors and municipality – that is, that both need the project to succeed in order to 
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meet their objectives. Where this is the case, the public party can be confident that the lenders 
will take on much of the burden of assuring the ongoing performance of the project. This is a 
key element of the transfer of risk from the public to the private sector in PPPs (EPEC PPP 
Guide). 
The fact that loan repayment depends mainly on the cash-flow generation of the project, 
aligns the incentives so that lenders understand the impact of their decisions on the viability 
of the project.  
In most PPPs analyzed there were no state guarantees which would reduce the financial costs 
of the PPP. However by takingpart of the demand risk, the public party is guaranteeing a 
minimal cash-flow generation and therefore reducing the probability of default. So, by 
assuming demand risk the public sector is indirectly assuming financial risks. On one hand, it 
is positive as it facilitates access to financial resources and reduces financial costs; on the 
other hand it increases the risk of the public party. 
vii) Legal/Regulatory and Political Risk 
a) Legislation Change Risk 
This refers to changes in government policies regarding laws and regulations that can impact 
directly or indirectly the PPP contract conditions.  
The private operator concern is that legislation changes, which are controlled by the public 
sector,affect the PPP conditions negatively.The private operator will try to ensure that it is 
compensated in the event that the rules upon which he relied when submitting his bid are 
changed and have adverse impacts on the ability to perform the activity or the financial return.  
The literature is divided regarding the right allocation of legislation risk (see Table 1). 
Allocation to the public sector can be justified on the fact that the public sector is perceived as 
the party best able to manage risks related to assurance, certainty and consistency of 
legislation. Besides, as mentioned by the 2012HMTreasury report, additional capital 
expenditure arising from an unforeseeable general change in law occurs on a very occasional 
basis, which means the public sector can secure better value money by keeping the risk 
instead of transferring itto the private sector and pay a premium.On the other hand, a lot of 
authors (Lewis 2001;Lam, Wang, Lee, & Tsang 2007;Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, &Hardcastle, 
2005)concluded that a shared allocation is the optimal one for legislation risk.Considering the 
fact that the municipalitydoes notcontrol satewide legislation, it seems valid that the private 
sector should keep part of legislation change risk. However as pointed by Ardnt the private 
party should be able to pass on any resulting additional costs to end users, as they would in 
any normal business. 
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All contracts have allocated the risk of legislation changes to the public sector, which is 
consistent with VfM generation according to some literature. However, a shared allocation 
was considered the optimal allocation by the majority of the literature analyzed. 
b) Political Risk 
When political risk is perceived as low, the private sector is more willing to join a PPP. In 
developed stable countries, political risks tend to have a minor impact in PPPs, therefore there 
is little to be gained in allocating them to the private party (Bing et all, 2005). Because 
political risks relate to the public parties commitment to the project, these risks should be 
dealt in the public sector sphere. The public party is the party better able to deal with that risk 
and because the private party as no control over this type of risk, it would not accept to take 
this kind risk (eg: the risk of a new public party revoking the contract without any type of 
compensation).  
Other aspects of political risk were already addressed in the demand and tariff risks sections. 
viii) Force majeure 
It is generally recognized that force majeure risk could be severe, but has a low probability of 
occurrence. The nature of external risk, such as force majeure, makes it outside the control of 
either party so that public and private parties may not be able to deal with it alone (Bing et all, 
2005). Those exogenous risks which are not easily allocated should be shared so that both 
parties have an incentive to manage them (Ardnt,2000). 
The agreement should provide the maximum incentive for both sides to avoid if possible, or 
else minimize any damage caused by these events. The risks that are known but impossible or 
too costly to manage should be covered by insurance contracts.  
All literature analyzed considers force majeure risk to be best allocated when it is shared 
between public and private parties. According to the OECD, risks that cannot be controlled by 
definition will not be best managed by the private sector. On the other hand, as mentioned by 
Marques and Berg, allocating completely the risk to the public sector greatly reduces the risk 
to the private operator, reducing its incentives to mitigate such risks. 
83% of the PPP contracts analyzed allocated force majeure risk to the public sector while the 
rest was allocated to the private sector. This constitutes a divergence from shared allocation 
proposed by most literature. This implies that in the majority of the contracts, the public 
sector assumed excessive risk on this particularly category. 
 
4.4 Final Remarks 
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In the cases analyzed above, very few risks were transferred to the private party. As already 
mentioned, without sufficient risk transfer, a PPP cannot generate efficiency to compensate 
the price difference between the project‟s weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) and the 
risk-free rate (Rf). The lack of a clear regulatory framework for the PPP project, the need for 
filling the gap on infrastructures, the lack of technical and managing expertise and 
personal/political interests are some of the variables that can explain the unbalanced risk 
matrix (as already stated in the Portuguese PPP experience literature review, and the analyzed 
PPPs background) 
Despite all of this,severalof the arguments gathered support a risk matrix where less risk is 
transferred to the private party considering the characteristics of the water sector, which 
implies the risk matrixes analyzed are not necessarily unbalanced.This leads to question if the 
PPP modelisthe right option for the water sector.   
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5. Case Study 
Based on the literature view on optimal risk allocation conclusions were taken regarding the 
Portuguese water sector PPPs risk allocation. However, the literature wasnot unanimous in 
relation to the allocation of certain risks and, in the author‟s view, the specificity of the water 
sector wasnot always considered. 
In order to test the conclusions made in the previous chapter, 3 case studies will be 
developed.The case study will provide additional and more detailed information to answer the 
research question. However the basis of the analysis will no longer be the literature view on 
optimal risk allocation but instead the concrete outcome of the PPPs analyzed in the case 
study. 
Three Portuguese water sectorPPPswill be analyzed. Both thesePPPs were object of an 
economic-financial equilibrium reposition process and object of a litigation process. In all of 
them the private party requested a financial compensation to restore the contract‟s economic 
equilibrium. Both parties never came to full agreement on the compensation terms which led 
to theintervention of the regulatory entities. 
By choosing PPPs with these characteristics it will be easier to track the influence of the risk 
matrix on the outcome of the PPP. 
The case study‟s research design will have the following structure: 
1. Research Questions: 
- What factors led to the outcomes of the PPP (financial disequilibrium and litigation 
process)? Notwithstanding the focus on risk allocation, it is important to have an overall 
picture of all factors that led the PPP in the direction it went. 
- How the risk allocation didinfluenced the PPP outcome (which is a sub-question of the 
one above)? 
The first research question cannot be translated into propositions. The second one however 
can be translated into hypothesis based on the conclusions taken in chapter 4.3.The following 
hypothesis will be constructed: 
- Demand risk should be shared between both parties 
- Price risk should be allocated to the public sector in the context of a water municipality 
- Financing risk (EURIBOR and spread variation) should be shared between both parties 
- Political Risk should be kept under the public sphere 
- Force Majeure Risk should be shared between both parties 
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The unit of analysis will be composed of theMatosinhos, Carrazeda de Ansiães e S. Maria da 
FeiraPPPs. Both this PPPs were object of an economic-financial equilibrium reposition 
process and object of a litigation process.  
5.2.1 BarcelosPPP 
Context 
In September 27th 2004, the municipality of Barcelos(CMB) celebrated a PPP contract with 
the private company Águas de Barcelos S.A. (ADB), whose main shareholder is AGS, for a 
30 year period, which included the management of the water supply and residual water 
treatment activities as well as the execution of several infrastructure investments. 
No study was made to evaluate the value for money of the project, which constitutes a 
problem right ahead as no objective criteria was used to choose the public private partnership 
over the traditional procurement.The base case constructed estimated a yearly 2.63% increase 
in water consumption. No study that supported these estimations was made.  
The investment plan initially defined in the contract amounted to a total of 116.363.461€ and 
was solely of ADB’s responsibility. In 2008 however, following the contract‟s economic 
equilibrium repositionCMBhas assumed the responsibility of some investments. With this 
decision,ADB’s investment plan was reduced in a total of 55.349.211€. 
ADB had to pay the municipality the following amounts over the years to explore the water 
supply activities: 
-Year 2005 - 1.483.827€;  
-Year 2006 - 1.620.039€;  
-Year 2007 - 415.006€;  
-From 2008 until 2034 - 341.735€/year  
 
Risk Matrix 
The table below summarizes the risk matrix of the contract. 
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Table 4 –Risk Matrix for Barcelos Water PPP Case (source: author) 
 
CMB assumes most risks, even those risks that are outside of its control like demand risk and 
financial risk. 
 
Economic Financial Equilibrium Restitution Request 
In July 10th 2009, after the investment reduction that followed the first equilibrium reposition, 
ADB started negotiations with CMB to restitute again the contract‟s economic financial 
equilibrium. The motive was the lower water demand compared to the base case. 
For the lower demand have contributed the non-verification of population growth 
expectations, lower water consumption per user and delays in construction works of the 
municipality responsibility, which impacted significantly the collection of new customers. 
The only factor that CMB could control was the construction works delay. Population growth 
and consumption per user are external factors outside the control of the municipality. This 
factor was however irrelevant as the risk matrix allocated demand risk to the public sector 
after a 20% variation, which meantADB could request a compensation to restitute the revenue 
loss caused by lower demand. 
ADB added that the loss of Cash-Flow severely restricted the access to the financial resources 
needed to pursue the investment plan. In 2012 there were already some deviations in the 
investment plan that ADB justified with lower project revenues. 
After 1 year of negotiations, there was no agreement between both parties, and the case ended 
up in court. 
 
Litigation Process 
Risk category Description Allocation
Demand risk Variation in demand compared to the base case scenario
Private party until a 20% variation
Public party after a 20% variation
Investment plan changes Changes in the scope of the investments or the values, in comparison to what was defined in the contract Public sector
Legislation changes Legislation changes that impact the service provision. Public party
Interest rate volatility Change in 6 month EURIBOR relative to the initial conditions
Private party: <20% variation
Public sector: >20% variation
Increase in the water cost 
(operational cost)
Changes in water cost bought to AdC (wholesales) that 
are not reflected in the tariff Public sector
Tariff changes Changes in the tariffs applied in comparison to what was previously set Public sector/consumers





In June 29th 2010, ADB took the case to court arguing the right to be compensated based on 
the risk matrix. 2 years laterCMBwas condemned to pay a direct compensation to ADB in the 
following terms: 
- Payment for the lower demand between 2005 and 2009, in the value of 24.602.600€ 
- Annual payment of 5.897.179€ from 2010 to 2035. 
The compensation mentioned above accounts for a total of 172.032.075€ over the years, 
which puts the municipality in a situation of possible bankruptcy. In 2012, at the time of the 
court‟s decision, the municipality had already a debt of 42.294.137€ to ADB, which 
corresponds to 77% of the municipalities revenues of that year. 
On the other side,ADB’s financial situation without the compensation mentioned above is 
very fragile. In 2010 and 2011 the company presented negative results of -17.221€ and -
2.982.255€ respectively and a very vulnerable financial autonomy. The company also incurs 
the risk of bankruptcy without the compensation. 
The concession is not sustainable to any of the parties. CMB will be in a possible scenario of 
bankruptcy if they compensate ADB in value determined by the court. ADB on the other hand 
doeshave the conditions to develop the activity without the reposition of the concession‟s 
financial equilibrium. 
Currently, the municipality is planning to exert its rescission right, by paying ADB a total 
amount of 87M€.  The municipality is going to contract a loan to make this payment in order 
to terminate the contract. 
 Even though the cost is high, it‟s still half of the amount CMB was condemned to pay. With 
this decision the municipality is in control of the exploration of the water supply and residual 
treatments and considering that the investment plan of ADB’sresponsibility is almost 
completed, the decision will benefit the municipality. 
 
Final Considerations 
The non-verification of the water consumption estimations was the main factor driving the 
loss of the concession‟s financial equilibrium. Because demand risk was allocated to the 
municipality after a 20% variation, CMBended up being the entity responsible for restoring 
that equilibrium, by compensating ADB. 
However,the main problem of the PPP so much the risk allocation, but insteadthe unrealistic 
base case scenario assumptions.The contract predicted a daily water consumption of 126 
liters/habitant in 2005, when in reality the consumption was only 112 liters/day. For the 
following years it assumed a growth rate of 2.63%, when actually water consumption 
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decreased over the years. This estimations werenot object of any study that would support 
them, which means there wasnot any effort on the municipality‟s part to build a consistent and 
realistic scenario. 
The audit court considered the risk allocation harmful to the public sector, highlighting that 
demand and interest rate volatility risks are operational risks that should be completely 
allocated to the private sector. 
The case can be made that demand risk should be allocated to the private entity. The private 
entity should be the one predicting the base case scenario and assuming the risk for those 
assumptions. This would align the incentives to construct a reasonablebase case scenario. 
Allocating demand risk to the public sector opens the door to badly designed contracts, if the 
public entity is not choosing a PPP route based on efficiency criteria. 
Finally, the project in itself is not financially sustainable, as the revenues generated by the 
activity (through water sale) werenot enough to cover the operational, investment and 
financial costs. 
 
5.2.2 Carrazeda de Ansiães PPP 
Context 
In June 2001 the municipality of Carrazeda de Ansiães (CMCA) signed a 30 year PPP 
contract with the company Águas de Carrazeda, S.A. (ADC), owned by AGS, to explore the 
services of catchment, treatment and distribution of water to public consumption. The 
investment plan attributed to the private operator over the 30 year period amounted to a total 
of 4.631.103€  
No study was made to assess the economic viability of the partnership, as legislation didnot 
made it mandatory at the time.  
 
Risk Matrix 
The only risks that were allocated to the public sector were force majeure risk, legislation 
risks and any unilateral change made by the municipality.This constitutes one of the few 
water PPP contracts where demand risk was completely allocated to the private sector. 
The mechanisms of compensation defined in the contract were direct compensation, extension 
of the contract duration, tariff changes or any other agreed mechanism. 
 
Economic Financial Equilibrium Restitution Request 
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In 2010, ADCrequested the reposition of the contract‟s economic financial equilibrium based 
on the following events: 
 Unilateral imposition of a lower water tariff than what was predicted in the contract 
The water supply tariffs should have increased by 42% in the first year of the concession, 
however they have remained unchanged until July 2003. After that point they started to be 
updated according to the formula previewed in the contract. 
The wastewater tariffs were only applied in 50% of the value predicted until 2006, from that 
point on they started being applied in their full value. 
 Lower Demand 
Due to lower population growth and water consumption compared to what was estimated, 
demand was much lower than expected. 
The levels of water consumption per habitant from 1995 to 1998 of the municipality varied 
between 78 liters/person/day and 85 liters/person/day. The water consumption predicted in the 
base case was 120 liters/person/day starting from 1999, which had no basis in reality. 
 Negative impact of the dry weather in the summer of 2005 and 2006. 
 Unilateral Changes in the investment plan made by the public sector. 
CMCA hasnot provided the land for the realization of the investments relative to 3 tanks, 
which conditioned the fulfillment of the investment plan with negative consequences to the 
concession. 
All this events impacted negatively ADC’sprofitability, asrevenues were around 50% of what 
was estimated in the base case. 
The municipality accepted all events susceptible of motivating a compensation, with the 
exception of the lower demand compared to the base case. The risk matrix allocated demand 
risk completely to the private operator which means contractually there is no obligation on 
CMCA’spart to compensate ADC for demand variations in relation to the base case forecasts.  
 
ERSAR and audit court view 
Both ERSAR (Water sector regulatory entity) and the audit court issued their view on the 
events discussed. 
According to both entities, the municipality should compensate ADC based on the period of 
lower tariff setting (tariff risk), the dry weather period (force majeure risk) and unilateral 
investment plan change (construction risk) initiated by the municipality. All these events were 
clearly stated in the risk matrix as being allocated to the public sector. 
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Even though force majeure risk was allocated to the public party, the audit court took an 
ambiguous position with respect to this event, highlighting the fact that the dry weather events 
of 2005 and 2006 could be considered as an operational risk of the activity, and its impact 
would have been lower if ADC had done an investment in 2002 (predicted in the contract) to 
increase the hydrographic basin. 
ERSAR and the audit court didnot agree however on whether or not demand risk should 
constitute an event to motivate compensations in ADC’s favor. 
According to ERSAR even though demand risk is allocated to the private party in the contract 
risk matrix, the projections regarding population growth and per capita water consumption 
were made by the public party. These estimations created a confidence in the assumptions of 
the business that were in the base of the contract celebration. Because the base case scenario 
constructed by the public sector wasnot realistic, the municipality should compensate 
ADCeven though the risk matrix allocates the risk completely to the private party. 
The audit court on the other hand stated that demand is an exogenous variable that is not 
controlled by any party, no matter which one has made the projections. Changes in the 
assumptions and variables of the base case cannot constitute by itself a reason for 
compensation by the public sector, unless the contract states that the risk is allocated to the 
public party. The audit court goes further and mentions that conceptually in a PPP, demand 
risk is inherent to the activity of the private party, meaning that the coverage of that risk by 
the public sector guarantees the private sector a business without any risk. 
Finally the audit court mentioned events that should generate compensations in CMCA’s 
favor. Those events include ADC’s operational inefficiency that led to a water loss of 40% 
instead of the 25% predicted in the base case, the non-realization of certain investments 
stipulated in the investment plan and the missing payment of the annual retribution to the 
municipality. CMCA also assumed the payment of 18 employer‟s wages requested by ADC 
in the value of 1.8 Million €. 
 
Contract Rescission 
In October 2015, CMCAunder José Luis Correiamandate (initiated in 2013) decided to 
revoke the contract in order to avoid more judicial problems and potential payments to the 
private party. The main issue was the tariff increase that was contractually defined and wasnot 
applied which generated the equilibrium loss of the PPP. Instead of restoring the contract‟s 
equilibrium, CMCA paid to ADC 1.8M€ to terminate the PPP contract and recover the 













Table 5 – Summary of the Risk Matrix of the Carrazeda Case (source: author) 
Events ADC CMCA ERSAR Audit Court 
Application of lower tariffs YES YES YES YES 
Population growth below estimations YES NO YES NO 
Demand below base case YES NO YES NO 
Investment Plan changes* YES YES YES YES 
Dry weather period (force majeure) YES YES YES YES 
Operational inefficiency by ADC management ----- ---- ---- YES 
Removal of Vila Flor municipality from the 
geographic scope of the PPP YES NO YES ------- 
 
*The party responsible should compensate the other. In this PPP events where both parties changed the investment plan 
 
The main factor that affected the PPP sustainability was the lower demand compared to the 
base case. The lower demand occurred mainly due to unrealistic estimations of population 
growth and per capita water consumption. The use of illegal connectors has also contributed 
to this factor with less impact however.Contrary to most PPPs, demand risk wasnot allocated 
to the public sector, which meant the private partner didnot have the right to any type of 
compensation as a consequence of lower demand. This was the main factor of conflict 
between ADC and CMCA.  
The only events that the municipality should assume as eligible to compensate the private 
operator are the period where tariffs werenot updated in accordance to the contract and the dry 
weather event and its negative impacts. 
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The municipality refused to update the tariffs in accordance to what was defined in the 
contract. Instead of restoring the PPP equilibrium by paying the private party and increasing 
the tariffs, CMCA revoked the contract. Considering the higher returns demanded by the 
private operators, the municipality might benefit with the decision, however the sustainability 
of the water services remains an issue whether managed as a PPP or solely by the public 
party. As already mentioned PPP model aligns the incentives to set sustainable tariffs, which 
could influence positively the management of the water systems.  
 
5.2.3 Paços de Ferreira PPP 
Context 
In 2004, Aguas de Paços de Ferreira S.A. (ADPF) signed a PPP contractwith Paços de 
Ferreira municipality (CMPF) for a 35 yearperiod. The scope of the partnership included the 
management of the water supply and residual water activities, as well as investments to 
expand the water supply network and rehabilitate certain infrastructures. 
No study was made to assess the economic viability of the partnership. At that time, 
legislation didnot obliged this kind of study to be made. 
 
Risk Matrix 
The risk matrix of the Paços de Ferreira PPP had the following structure: 
 
Table 6 –Summary of the Risk Matrix of the Paços De Ferreira Case (source: Author) 
 
 
The compensations can take place as a direct one, a change of the concession‟s period, by 
changing the tariffs or any other mechanism that both parties agree on. This compensation 
will be set according to the deviation from the base case. 
Risk category Description Allocation
Demand risk Variation in demand compared to the base case scenario
Private party until a 20% variation
Public party after a 20% variation
Investment plan changes Changes in the scope of the investments or the values, in comparison to what was defined in the contract Public sector
Legislation changes Legislation changes that impact the service provision. Public party
Interest rate volatility Change in 6 month EURIBOR relative to the initial conditions Private party
Tariff changes Changes in the tariffs applied in comparison to what was previously set Public sector/consumers
Force Majeure Any force majeure situation that impacts the contract conditions Public sector
32 
 
The economic financial equilibrium of the concession is met when the following financial 
ratios are met: 
- debt service coverage ratio (DSCR): 1.39 
- loan life coverage ratio (LLCR): 1.5 
- shareholder‟sInternal Rate of Return: 10.61% 
 
Investment Plan 
The goal of the investment plan defined in the concession was to achieve a water supply 
coverage ratio of around 95% of the resident population. The investment plan was entirely of 
ADPF responsibility. 
The total investment predicted to the concession‟s period amounted to 71.839.772€. The 
investment plan execution was divided in two phases. The first one involved the construction 
of new infrastructures and was implemented in the first 5 years. The second one included 
mainly maintenance investments. 
 
Economic Financial Equilibrium Restitution 
In October 31th 2006 the contract was object of a financial economic equilibrium reposition 
in favor of ADPF. The company requested a compensation because water demand had a 
negative variation of more than 20% in comparison to the base case and water tariffs werenot 
set by the municipality in accordance to the contracts pre-agreed levels.  
All theseevents were defined in the risk matrix as eligible to motivate a compensation in favor 
of the private party. In order to compensate ADPF, the municipality took on one investment 
in the value of 5.185.651€ that should be made by the private entity. The municipality also 
committed to increase tariffs by 3% for the years of 2008, 2009 and 2010. The assumptions 
made in the base case regarding demand were also reviewed, as estimations of water 
consumption per habitant were revised downwards in 3%. 
Soon after both parties agreement regarding the terms of the compensation, several events led 
to another loss of the contract‟s Economic Financial Equilibrium. 
Following this equilibrium loss ADPF requested in 2009 another financial compensation due 
to: 
 Tariff update did not follow the agreement. As mentioned, the municipality should have 
increased the tariffs by 3% on a yearly basis starting from 2008. However the municipality 
didnot update the tariffs in 2008 and 2009. In 2010 tariffs were increased, but only by 
1.31%. Not only has the municipality not applied the agreed tariffs but in 2007 it has 
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given a 400€ discount in network connection tariffs and applied a 50% discount in the 
sanitation inspection tariffs. 
 Demand downward variation of more than 20% in comparison to the new base case (per 
capita water consumption predicted was lowered 8%). Even though the base case 
estimations were revised downwards between 2007 and 2012, water consumption still had 
negative variations of 34.3% in comparison to the new base case. 
 The use of illegal connectors increased a lot, which has also contributed to less demand. 
The municipality has pledged to use all legal tools to enforce the connection to the public 
water systems, however according to ADPF, the municipality hasnot made the necessary 
efforts to ensure this obligation. 
Both parties reunited 3 times trying to reach an agreement. In May 6th 2013, ADPF presented 
a proposal in accordance to its financial advisor view. AGS rejected the proposal because it 
didnot replace the ratios to the levels agreed in the contract.The model proposed by ADPF 
resulted in negative DSCR and LLCR ratios and an IIR of 6.86%, which didnot meet any of 
the ratios values mentioned above. The negotiations ended with no agreement between both 
parties. 
 
Regulatory entities view 
ERSAR and the audit court werenot very clear regarding their recommendations. ERSAR 
considered that the equilibrium‟s reposition was made in a very early stage of the contract. 
The contract clause relative to demand variation should only be applied after a long enough 
period of consistent lower demand. Requesting compensations at such an early point of the 
contract undermines the stability of the PPP and certain negative variations could be 
compensated by positive variations in the future. 
The audit court only stated that in the current economic environment and considering the 
efforts of public finances consolidation it‟s important to revise the shareholder remuneration 
downwards to protect the public interest. 
Currently both parties are trying to renegotiate the financial equilibrium through a tariff 
increase but also through the reduction of the private operator‟s rate of return. 
 
Final Considerations 




The municipality failed to update the water tariffs in accordance to the agreed levels. Not only 
that, the municipality gave additional discounts. The private operator should notfinance this 
kind of discounts for social/political reasons. Tariff regulation must follow an economic 
efficiency principle,which means setting tariffs that sustain the activity at the socially optimal 
level. 
Tariffs must therefore be updated and CMPF should have the right to be compensated for the 
periods where tariffs were not set in accordance to the contract. 
The assumptions regarding population growth and per habitant consumption were out of 
touch with reality, which created false expectations regarding the profitability potential of the 
project. ADPF has the right to be compensated according to the risk matrixeven though the 
factors related to population growth and water consumption are outside the municipality‟s 
control. 
There is however one factor that affects demand and that the municipality can influence. And 
that is the supervision of the use of illegal connectors. As mentioned by ADPF, there was no 
real effort on CMPF‟s part to identify and legally take action to reduce the use of these 
alternative infrastructures. This has a significant impact on revenues as it doesnot allow the 
private entity to make the proper return out of the investments made. 
The project does not seem to have the potential to generate the expected economic results. 
Consequently it is important to review downwards the shareholder revenues while making 
sure that all efforts are made on the municipality‟s part to guarantee the sustainability of the 
project. That means applying the right tariffs so that profit margins can be maintained at 
proper levels as well as reinforcing the connection of users to the public water network. 
 
5.2.4 Case Studies Conclusions 
1. What factors led to the outcomes (financial disequilibrium and litigation process)? 
The loss of economic equilibrium happened because the concession‟s profitability 
expectations were very optimistic. 
The two main factors that contributed to less profitability were demand levels below the 
expected values as well as lower tariffs than the levels agreed. 
The lower demand can be explained by population growth below expectations, lower water 
consumption per habitant and higher use of illegal connectors than expected. 




In essence, the construction of unrealistic base cases was what contributed to the 
contracts‟economic equilibrium loss. The municipalitiesassumed an unrealistically optimistic 
scenario. No serious studies weremade to support the predictions, and looking at certain 
variables made clear that population growth and water consumption couldnot follow the 
estimated path. The private parties also did not made the necessary due diligence to assess the 
reasonability of the base cases. 
The revenues generated by activity werenot enough to sustain the private operators‟expected 
returns (IRR).To sustain such high returns the public sector has to compensate the private 
sector, which subverts the purpose of using the PPP model. 
The financial equilibrium loss led the private parties to request compensations based on the 
risk matrix allocation. The municipalities‟ refusal to accept some of these requests led to the 
litigation processes. 
 
2. Risk allocation propositions 
 Demand risk should be shared? 
As already mentioned, one of the main factors leading to the PPPs economic disequilibrium 
was the lower demand compared to the base case scenario. 
There was a clear optimism bias in demand forecast. The public parties overestimated water 
demand and consequently the projects‟ potential revenues. 
The allocation of demand risk to the private party is a way of overcoming this optimism bias. 
The private operator would have to make sure the base case presented was realistic otherwise 
it would have to face the consequences of overestimating demand (as it happened with 
Carrazeda PPP). Allocating demand to the private sector should generate efficiency as it 
aligns the incentives to construct a realistic base case scenarios, eliminating the optimism bias 
associated with the public sector‟s estimations. (This however did not occur in Carrazeda PPP 
where demand risk was allocated to ADC, as the private party didnot construct a base case 
scenario, trusting instead in the municipality predictions).   
Furthermore, as stated by the audit court, demand risk is inherent to the activity of the private 
party, meaning that the coverage of that risk by the public sector guarantees the private sector 
a business without any risk. 
There is however one situation where the public party can influence demand, and that is 
through the supervision of the use of illegal connectors. By legally enforcing the connection 
to the public water systems, the government can control the rate of connections to the network 
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and consequently demand.By allocating to the public party demand deviations coming from 
the use of illegal water supply structures, efficiency is being generated.  
 Tariffs variation risk should be allocated to the public sector in the context of the water 
sector?  
Contrary to demand variables, tariffs are totally controlled by the public party. As a result, the 
risk of price change should be allocated to the municipalities. In thePaços de Ferreira PPP, for 
instance, the municipality gave discounts on certain tariffs and did not update them in 
accordance to the levels agreed in contract. This clearly constitutes a situation where a price 
decision is made for social/political reasons with negative consequences to the revenues of the 
private operator.  
Allocating the risk of tariff variation to the public sector assures efficiency as it forces the 
public sector to set sustainable tariffs. 
 Financing risk should be shared between both parties  
Interest rate fluctuations were not clearly discussed in the case study. However, the private 
operator‟s ability to comply with their financial obligations was damaged by the concession‟s 
economic equilibrium loss. This could easily translate into worse spread conditions. 
The argument can be made that the party responsible for the loss of cash flow generation 
should be the one taking the consequences of the interest rate variations. This might generate 
some problems however, as it is not easy always easy to identify what motivated the interest 
rate variation. 
 Political Risk should be allocated to the public party 
The political risk was clearly materialized in Carrazeda PPP. The new president decided to 
terminate the PPP. Even though Carrazeda PPP had one of the most balanced risk matrixes, 
the new public management team wanted to recover the management of the water systems, 
mainly to regain control over tariff setting. The rescission clause was set to protect the private 
party from this kind risk. Since the public party is unilateral taking the decision of revoking 
the contract, the allocation to the public sector is appropriate. 
 Force Majeure Risk should be shared 
The Carrazeda PPP reinforces the arguments mentioned by the literature regarding the 
allocation of force majeure risk. This type of risk should be shared so that both parties have an 
incentive to manage them. 
The dry weather events of 2005 and 2006 impact on the private operator‟s costs would be 
lower if ADC had done the investments to increase the hydrographic basin. 
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If the force majeure was shared, ADC would have the incentive to pursuit that investment to 
minimize the potential damage of the dry weather event. This constitutes another example 





The unsustainability risk of a PPP that results from demand risk, market risks, financial risks, 
construction risks and exploration risks should be transferred to the private sector as much as 
possible.Looking at the water sector PPPs analyzed, almost always only construction risks 
and exploration risk were transferred to the private sector. 
Considering the characteristics of the water sector and the view of certain authors, tariff risk, 
legislation change risk and interest rate fluctuations risk can be reasonably allocated to the 
public sector.Allocating tariff risk to the public sector actually assures efficiency, as it forces 
the public party to set sustainable tariffs.  
Looking at demand risk however, the same cannot be concluded. The risk of demand is 
inherent to the activity of the private party and the coverage of that risk by the public sector 
guarantees a business without any risk to the private sector.Only demand risk resulting from 
the use of illegal water supply infrastructures could be reasonably allocated to the private 
sector.Finally, the allocation of demand risk to the private sector aligns incentives to construct 
a sound base case. 
The same conclusion can be made regarding force majeure risk, which should be shared 
between the two parties, so that both maximize the efforts to reduce the potential damage of 
those events. Most contracts allocated the risk completelyto the public sector which also 
doesnot promote efficiency.  
The risk allocation of the water PPPs was overall unbalanced, as there wasnot enough risk 
transfer to the private party.Considering the unbalanced risk matrix, it can be argued that the 
water sector PPPsdonot generate Value for Money. Given the lack of risk transfer to the 
private sector and very high Shareholder returns, it can be concluded that the private sector 
didnot generate enough efficiency to compensate the price difference between the project‟s 
weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) and the risk-free rate (Rf). Therefore, keeping the 





7. Appendix  
(A) Major Arguments favoringeach risk allocation option by risk category 
Risk Definition 
Risk Allocation - Arguments favoring each allocation 
Public Sector Shared  Private Sector 
Design and 
Construction Risk 
Risks related to investment planning and 
execution. Deviation from the plan, delays and 
cost overrun 
    
As the party responsible for the 
investments, all risks associated 
with the execution of those 
investments should be allocated 
to the private party so that 
efficiency is generated 
regarding cost, timings, etc. 
Operation and 
Maintenance risk 
Risks arising from asset management. Operation 
cost overrun, water price cost variation and asset 
obsolesce 
    
As the party responsible for 
managing the activities, all 
operational risks should be 
transferred to the private party. 
Demand risk 
The risk that water demand is lower than 
forecasts which results in total revenue derived 
from the project varying from the base case 
expectations 
Demand variation resulting 
from the use of illegal 
connectors should be allocated 
to the public sector, as they 
have the responsibility of 
supervising the connection to 
the network 
private sector is in no better 
position than the government 
to predict demand 
 
private sector has no direct 
commercial link with end 
users 
 
demand is highly inelastic due 
to monopoly characteristics, 
which limits any added 
benefits stemming from the 
use of innovation by the 
private sector  
 Business risk should be faced 
by the private sector 
 
Aligns incentives to build a 
sound base case 
Tariff Risk 
The risk that tariffs are set differently than what is 
defined in the contract, resulting in revenue 
varying from the base case 
As a monopoly, prices are 
regulated or politically 
determined, which means the 
risk should be managed by the 
party that is responsible for 
influencing the price. Which 
aligns incentives to set tariffs 
based on economical rational 
instead of political ones 
    
Financing risk 
Interest rate fluctuations that affect the projects 
financing cost. EURIBOR and spread variations 
over the concession period  
Spread: If it‟s the party 
responsible for increasing the 
project‟s risk and therefore 
spread 
  
EURIBOR variation is an 
economic risk that should be 
faced by the private operator 
Spread: If it‟s the party 
responsible for increasing the 
project‟s risk and therefore 
spread 
Legislation Risk Risk associated with unstable national/regional laws that can affect the project outcomes 
Legislation Changes are 
completely under the public 
sector‟s control 
 
Legislation risk rarely 
materializes, meaning the 
public sector creates value for 
money by retaining the risk and 
avoiding risk premium 
payment. 
State wide legislation is not 
under the municipality control  
State wide legislation change 
it‟s a risk that is inherent to any 
business activity 
Force Majeure Risk 
Risk of unpredictable catastrophic events that 
affect the parties ability to perform it‟s project 
obligations 
  
Force Majeure Risk should be 
shared so that both parties 
maximize the efforts to 
minimize the damage of 





Appendix (B) Literature risk matrix vs Portuguese water sector PPPs 
        Allocation 
 
Risk Category 
Allocation to the public sector Shared Allocation Allocation to the private sector 
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